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JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(l)(1992). 
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ISSUES 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in determining that the marital property placed in 
the Endrody Trust (approximate value $800,000), was not available for distribution to 
plaintiff, thereby allowing the trust to control all of the parties assets and evict the plaintiff 
from the family home and charge her $10,000 in back rent. 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to impute income to defendant based 
upon his historical earnings and award plaintiff alimony consistent therewith. 
3. Whether the Trial Court erred in not requiring defendant to account for property 
sold during the divorce proceedings. 
4. Whether the Trial Court erred in determining that the prenuptial agreement 
precluded the plaintiff from receiving assets accumulated during the marriage. 
5. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to award plaintiff attorney's fees in the 
amount requested at trial. 
6. Whether the plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for this case is taken from Lee v. Lee, 714 P. 2d 1378 (Utah 
App. 1987): 
"In divorce proceedings the trial court has considerable discretion in 
adjusting the financial interests of the parties. Argyle v. Argyle. 688 P. 2d 
468 (Utah 1984). The determination of the value of the assets is a matter for 
the trial court which will not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P. 2d 6 (Utah 1982). However, the trial 
court must make findings on all material issues and its failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, incapable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
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judgment. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987). The findings must 
be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the 
steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented 
id." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-1 et. seq., (as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PREFACE 
This is a divorce case filed by plaintiff against the defendant. After several hearings 
on various motions for temporary orders, including a motion for contempt against the 
defendant, Laszlo Endrody Jr., the matter was tried before J. Philip Eves, District Judge, 
who issued a memorandum decision and later findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
decree of divorce. The plaintiff appealed the Court's decision relating to division of 
property, alimony, violation of court orders and attorney's fees. 
B. FACTS 
Appellant/Plaintiff (wife) hereafter plaintiff, and Appellee/Defendant (husband) 
hereafter defendant, are the principal parties to this action. The parties met in Iron County, 
State of Utah, sometime in 1975. Defendant was employed by the Panama Canal 
Commission and plaintiff was in the process of going back into the army as a sergeant, 
intending to make the military her career (Tr. 200, 201). The marriage took place on April 
11, 1975 and from that time until 1979, the parties lived in Panama where defendant 
worked as a captain for the Panama Canal Commission and plaintiff delivered and cared 
for the parties two (2) minor children (Tr. 201, 202). The defendant was making 
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approximately $24,000 per year in 1975 (Tr. 42) and in 1977 he was making approximately 
$38,000 per year (Tr. 42). By 1986 the defendant was earning approximately $118,000 
per year and he testified that his employment increased incrementally from $24,000 per 
year in 1975 to $118,000 per year in 1986 (Tr. 44, 45, 46). In 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 
1991 until the filing of the divorce complaint, defendant made over $100,000 per year. See 
income tax returns for those years (Exhibits P-2, P-3, Tr. 43 thru Tr. 50). 
At the time of the marriage in 1975, defendant had a one-third (Vfe) interest in a farm 
in Iron County, with some water rights (P-1). The total property consisted of 
approximately 640 acres (Tr. 27) and a majority of the property was not under cultivation 
at that time and did not have sprinkler lines and could not be irrigated. The property was 
purchased for $80,000 (Tr. 27) with a $25,000 down payment made by defendant's 
parents (Tr. 28) and yearly payments made by defendant (Tr. 28) until the balance plus 
interest was paid in full. (Tr. 28, P-1). From the time of the purchase in 1970 until 1975, 
the time of the marriage, the defendant did not make more than $24,000 per year and did 
not have the funds to increase the value of the farm property (Tr. 42). During the marriage 
plaintiff maintained the family home and the defendant pursued his employment and 
investments (Tr. 201, 202). As captain for the Panama Canal Commission defendant was 
required, during the early part of the marriage, to spend eleven (11) months per year in 
Panama until approximately 1979 when his schedule was changed to allow him to spend 
one (1) month at home and six (6) weeks in Panama (Tr. 233). From 1979 until the time 
of the divorce, plaintiff lived in Iron County and was a homemaker caring for her husband 
and the two (2) minor children (Tr. 233). 
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From 1975 until the time plaintiff filed for divorce, the assets of the parties increased 
as follows: 
1. The farm property was improved with additional water rights, additional 
sprinkling lines (Tr. 41) and additional acreage under cultivation and was worth $437,000 
at the time the divorce was heard (Tr. 225). 
2. The parties purchased three (3) homes during the marriage which included a 
Cedar City home valued at $62,000 (Tr. 225), an Enoch home valued at $105,000 (Tr 
225), and a Garden Park home which was sold after the divorce was filed and netted 
$36,135 (Tr. 228). 
3. The parties purchased five (5) acres near the Garden Park home which was 
valued at $25,000 (Tr. 227). 
4. The parties purchased farm equipment which was appraised at $79,125 (Tr. 226 
and 227) at the time of the divorce. 
5. The parties had cattle on the Endrody Ranch property valued at $56,495 at the 
time of the divorce and plaintiff admitted selling fifty seven (57) head of personal cattle 
worth at least $30,000 in violation of the court order prior to the time of the divorce (Tr. 
102) (see also, court order dated April 19, 1993). 
6. The defendant created a corporation known as Endrody Trucking and the assets 
of that company as set forth on the 1986 federal income tax return was $66,692 (Exhibit 
P-2). Defendant claimed, without documentation, that fifty one thousand (51,000) shares 
of that corporation (which represent a majority of the shares) were owned by the Endrody 
Trust (Tr. 97). 
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Defendant testified that his income from the Panama Canal Commission was 
$118,000 in 1986 (Tr. 44) and that he had a farm loss of $100,000 (Tr. 45). In 1987 the 
parties tax return showed an income from the Panama Canal Commission of $103,291 and 
a farm loss of $90,000 (Tr. 47). The parties tax return for 1988 showed an income of 
$104,431 (Tr. 47) and a farm loss of $50,679 (Tr. 48). The parties income tax return for 
1989 showed an income from the Panama Canal Commission of $109,432 and a farm loss 
of $100,034. The parties tax return for 1990 showed an income of $121,000 (Tr. 49) and 
a farm loss of $92,134 (Tr. 50). 
The defendant created an entity known as the Endrody Trust in 1984 (P-1) and 
claimed that almost all of the parties property was trust property at the time of the divorce. 
The Endrody Trust, by its terms, allowed the defendant to treat the trust property as his 
own (see Endrody Trust, P-9, particularly 1J12.4). During the marriage the defendant 
conducted the financial affairs of the parties and the plaintiff signed the documents placed 
in front of her for her signature (Tr. 204). 
After the divorce complaint was filed, the defendant resigned as trustee of the 
Endrody Trust and appointed his daughter (by another marriage) as trustee (D-15). 
Defendant testified that he resigned as trustee of the trust because of the divorce (Tr. 
118). Defendant also voluntarily resigned as a captain for the Panama Canal Commission 
and also quit as a steward for Masters, Mates and Pilots lowering his income from 
approximately $120,000 per year to a retirement amount of $2,420.40 per month. 
Defendant testified that he could have continued his work with the Panama Canal 
Commission for at least two (2) more years (Tr. 114). Defendant also resigned as 
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president of Endrody Trucking and had his daughter (by another marriage) installed as 
president. 
Defendant acknowledges that he was trustee and operator of the Endrody Ranch 
all during the marriage and that he made all decisions relating to the ranch and the trust 
by himself (Tr. 88). After the divorce was filed, defendant stated that he no longer 
operated the ranch (Tr. 117) and contended that his daughter made the decisions relating 
to the trust, the corporation and the ranch. 
During the divorce proceedings all of the assets of Endrody Trust, Endrody 
Trucking, together with the homes and other real property, the farm equipment, the cattle 
(which were sold in violation of the court order), the hay and any other assets owned by 
the parties (value approximately $800,000) were controlled by the defendant. In contrast, 
at the same time, the plaintiff testified that she had no medical insurance and could not get 
enough money together for needed surgery on her teeth (Tr. 207). She further testified 
that she pawned what little jewelry she had for $300 and used that money for living 
expenses and had no security to gain a loan (Tr. 210, 211). Her only funds consisted of 
$786.46 which the court had awarded her on a temporary basis and she was renting a 
portion of the house she was living in for $250. She was also getting a disability check for 
$85, making her total income $1,121.46, and when the Judge finally made his decision 
regarding the divorce, she was immediately evicted from the family home. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Issue relating to the Endrody Trust Property: Plaintiff and defendant 
accumulated approximately $800,000 in marital assets during a seventeen (17) year 
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marriage. Approximately halfway through the marriage, defendant placed certain property 
in a trust known as the Endrody Trust. Some of the trust property was partially 
documented and at trial, the defendant claimed that almost all of the property accumulated 
by the parties during the marriage (with marital assets) was trust property. The Trial Court 
accepted the defendants testimony regarding what property was owned by the trust, even 
though said testimony was not properly documented. As an example, the defendant 
testified that certain equipment and certain cattle belonged to the trust. There was no 
documentation concerning how that property got into the trust or how the defendant made 
such a determination. The Trial Court concluded that the majority of the property 
accumulated by the parties during the marriage was trust property. The Trial Court then 
ordered that five hundred fifty and one-half (550 V2) of the defendants shares in the trust 
should be held by the defendant subject to a constructive trust imposed by the Trial Court 
requiring defendant to hold title to those shares in trust for plaintiff and she was awarded 
the voting rights and the right to any property distribution attributed to those shares. The 
trust document, as testified by defendant, was an in-house document which could be 
amended at will. This simply means that defendant was placed in a position to use that 
property as he chooses, to transfer that property as he chooses and to issue additional 
shares as he chooses, thereby making plaintiffs shares virtually worthless. It is plaintiffs 
contention that the Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court, award plaintiff her 
share of the trust property and give defendant credit for any premarital or separate 
property. 
2. Issue regarding alimony: The Trial Court found that defendant's income was 
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$120,000 per year at the time the divorce was filed. The evidence was undisputed that 
defendant voluntarily quit all of his employment and was making approximately $2,500 per 
month (from retirement) at the time of the trial. The Trial Court refused to take this 
undisputed evidence into account when alimony was awarded. The Trial Court made an 
alimony award of $300 per month based on a monthly income of $2,500. The plaintiff 
is asking the Court of Appeals to reverse this decision and remand the matter to the Trial 
Court for an alimony award consistent with a monthly salary of approximately $10,000 per 
month. 
3. Issue regarding sale of assets during the divorce process: The defendant 
sold $30,000 worth of personal property during the divorce proceedings and was 
instrumental in a sale of one of the trust homes which netted approximately $36,000. The 
Trial Court did not require defendant to account for these assets and simply concluded that 
the proceeds were used to reduce debt. These determinations were not set forth in the 
findings of fact or the memorandum decision of the Trial Court and it is impossible to 
determine why the Trial Court did not require defendant to account for the sale of those 
assets. 
4. Issue relating to prenuptial agreement: The Trial Court held the prenuptial 
agreement valid and then concluded that the property covered by the prenuptial 
agreement was improved, augmented and commingled with marital assets. The Trial 
Court then awarded plaintiff shares in the trust which could be changed at will by the 
defendant. It is plaintiffs position that the Court of Appeals should reverse and remand, 
instructing the Trial Court to determine what property was covered by the prenuptial 
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agreement or was premarital property which had not been augmented, improved or 
commingled. After this decision is made, it is plaintiff's position that she be awarded one 
half (1/£) of the property which is part of the martial estate. 
5. Issue relating to attorney's fees: The Trial Court determined that the request 
for attorney's fees submitted by plaintiffs attorneys were fair and reasonable. Plaintiffs 
attorney's fees with costs total $37,033.75. The Court then awarded plaintiff $15,000 for 
attorney's fees. The findings of fact and memorandum decision prepared by the court do 
not set forth how the court arrived at its decision to reduce the attorney's fee award by 
$22,033.75. Obviously the court found that the plaintiff was in need by awarding her 
$15,000 in attorney's fees. It was incumbent upon the court to determine the procedure 
used in reducing the attorney's fee award. The plaintiff now requests that the Court of 
Appeals instruct the Trial Court to award plaintiff her reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
totaling $37,033.75. 
6. Issue relating to attorney's fees on appeal: The plaintiff contends that the 
parties accumulated approximately $800,000 worth of marital assets over the period of a 
seventeen (17) year marriage and that the Trial Courts award, in effect, gives her none of 
that property. It is her position that if she prevails on appeal that the Court of Appeals 
should determine that she is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee relating to the appeal 
process. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
MARITAL PROPERTY PLACED IN THE ENDRODY TRUST 
(APPROXIMATE VALUE $800,000) WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR 
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DISTRIBUTION TO PLAINTIFF, THEREBY ALLOWING THE TRUST TO 
CONTROL ALL OF THE PARTIES ASSETS AND EVICT THE PLAINTIFF 
FROM THE FAMILY HOME AND CHARGE HER $10,000 IN BACK RENT. 
The personal income tax returns for Laszlo and Carolyn Endrody were admitted into 
evidence as Exhibits P-2 and P 3 I he income tax returns Ior the Endrody Trust were 
admitted into evidence as Exhibits P-5. These documents demonstrate a course of action 
by Laszlo Endrody from at least 1986 until the complaint for divorce was filed, where Mr. 
Endrody used Ins incnmp In iinpi'ove his mnrh property, a\ »"oid paying federal income taxes 
and keep titles to any properties out of his wife's name. When asked concerning these 
actions, the defendant testified that his accountant told I mi II nal I le would have to si IOW a 
profit on the Endrody Ranch property every five (5) years (Tr. 50) although the tax returns 
show the Endrody Ranch always lost money. The Trial Court decided, as set forth in the 
findings of fact ar id conclusions of \m i-imIII mHnoranduin derision, " plaintiff w 
entitled to a small amount of equipment, no cattle, three thousand (3,000) shares in 
Endrody Trucking and one half (1/4) of the shares in the Endrody linsi iiiiiHu in the n .Jim I 
the defendant, subject to a constructive trust to be held by defendant for the use and 
benefit of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was also ordered to pay child support in the sum of $105 
and given $300 per nH nitl i • v. | milinneril MIIIIIIIK H ly.»id assessed $10,000 in back 
careful review of six hundred thirty-eight (638) pages of transcript taken during the trial of 
property placed in the trust was not marital property that should be awarded to plaintiff. 
After hearing the testimony and concluding the trial, the Trial Court issued a memorandum 
decision which contained, among other things, the following: 
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"After the creation of the trust the defendant continued to make 
improvements to the ranch, to buy and sell farm equipment to supply the 
seed, labor and electrical power needs of the ranch, to farm and raise 
livestock, and to pay rental payments to the trust for the use of the land and 
water. The income generated by these activities was not the property of the 
trust. The parties and the trust filed separate tax returns and for the years 
1987 through 1990 those returns indicate that the farm was losing large 
amounts of money and the defendant was using his earnings from the Canal 
to pay many of the costs associated with running the ranch and buying the 
equipment and supplies needed to do so" (Memorandum Decision pp 5 and 
6). 
"The defendant sent all his earnings home to his father, who handled the 
defendant's banking. The father would see that the plaintiff was given 
enough money to feed and care for the family until the defendant came home 
on one of his long leaves" (Memorandum Decision pp 6). 
"During the marriage, the parties or the trust acquired additional properties 
which present issues in this case. In 1982, the parties bought a home in 
Cedar City which they paid for with marital funds. The title to the home was 
taken by the plaintiff and the defendant as trustees for the two (2) minor 
children of the parties, Michael and Linda. After the trust was created, the 
Cedar City home was transferred into the trust, with the agreement of both 
the plaintiff and the defendant. Plaintiff received 70 additional shares in the 
trust upon her agreement to transfer the Cedar City home to the trust. 
Thereafter, the parties paid rent to the Trust for the use of the house. The 
defendant has occupied this home during these proceedings and is being 
assessed rent by the trust" (Memorandum Decision, pp 9). 
"The defendant admits that he expected to inherit the ranch upon the death 
of his parents prior to the creation of the trust. Since he has the majority of 
the shares issued in the trust, he has treated the ranch as his own property 
throughout the marriage and has spent a great deal of money and time on 
improvements to the property. As of April 17, 1992, the ranch and 
improvements thereon, including sprinklers, wells, water distribution lines, 
buildings, two (2) mobile homes, corrals and fences, were appraised as 
having a fair market value of $437,000" (Memorandum Decision pp 7). 
"Since defendant is still the majority share holder in the trust and his 
daughter is the current trustee, the court is convinced that defendant could 
resume the position of trustee at will" (Memorandum Decision pp 9). 
"During the time that the parties resided in that home, they paid rent to the 
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trust for the use of the premises. Patty Heinz, the current trustee of the trust, 
has testif ied that once this divorce case is decided, the trust wil l seek the 
ouster of the plaintiff from the Enoch home and will hold defendant 
responsible for all losses the trust has suffered during the time the plaintiff 
has occupied the home without paying the required rent" (Memorandum 
Decision pp 9-10). 
There was i nentation submitted m i . II ly if thi:> exhibits that v il< IIII « H II i mi • 
to the conclusion that any rent was paid to the trust or that any rent was assessed against 
III""1* III! and Mrs. Endrody by II! if" l iusl 111 88). The 01 \\) evidence regarding rent payments 
was submitted by Mr. Endrody (Tr. 88) and his daughter in verbal testimony (Tr. 410). It 
is obvious that rent was never paid because the Trial Court found that $20,000 was due 
in rent. The Court of Appeals held in Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P. 2d 585 (Utah App. 1993) 
that issues concerning liens or debts supported only by the husband's testimony does not 
pi ovide suffiiciei it evidence i 
debts defendant claims were owed to the trust. The Court states in its memorandum 
decision that rental payments were made, however, there was no evidence of that at the 
trial ai id it is impossible to shovii Il determined that $20,000 was due tc till ie 
trust for back rent or what rental payments were made to the trust. 
In Gardner v. Gardner, 7 H II" , i l II I III. illi lliHi'.|i llm urn I tidil lllluil III;I III.ill 
property "encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, 
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 
2d 421 (Utah App. 1990), the Court held that "in dividing property between parties in a 
divorce action, the overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable." The 
count quoted Bur t v. Bui t, i Li9 P ?\ ! 11 H»(I ltd! i Apfj I  lJ»(11 . ti id Bun I quoted Newmever 
v. Newmever. 745 P. 2d 1276 (Utah 1987). In this case, the testimony, as recited in the 
statement of facts, together with the exhibits, including the income tax returns, and the 
findings of the court clearly show that plaintiff and defendant took a $80,000 piece of 
property and used the income from defendants employment over a period of fifteen (15) 
years to turn that piece of property into a $437,000 asset which defendant treated as his 
own and knew that he would inherit. The property was placed in the Endrody Trust along 
with other investments accumulated by the parties during the marriage and the majority of 
the parties assets (valued at over $800,000) were determined by the Trial Court, to be held 
in the trust at the time the divorce was filed. 
In the case of Lee v. Lee. 714 P. 2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals 
dealt with a case where the husband and wife were married almost nine (9) years. Prior 
to the marriage, the husband and his brother established a garbage collection business 
in which the husband made a substantial monetary investment from personal assets. 
Subsequent to the parties marriage, the husband and his brother sold the garbage 
business and established D & D Equipment and Supply Inc. The husband owned fifty two 
percent (52%) of the shares of D & D and the Trial Court awarded all of the husband's 
interest in D & D exclusively to the husband. The Court of Appeals said that D & D was 
established after the parties marriage and its value was actualized during the marriage and 
therefore the wife was entitled to her share of that corporation. The court said the wife 
made a significant contribution by taking care of the family home which freed the husband 
to participate full time in running the business. In the instant case, the value of the 
Endrody Trust was actualized during the marriage, the property was placed in the trust 
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during the marriage and the plaintiff made a significant contribution by taking care of the 
family home so that the defendant cc i ilcl participate in 11 ii;. i i iplcn 11 m m ml ai IK i 111 ipi 1 n/ornont 
of the Endrody Ranch. 
In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421 (Utah App. 1990), the Court made the 
following footnote: 
1. "In appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be awarded property which 
the other spouse brought into the marriage. Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P. 2d 
1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988); see e.g.. Noble. 761 P. 2d at 1373; Moon v. 
Moon, 790 P. 2d 52, 56 (Utah App. 1990); Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P. 2d 
593, 595-6 (Utah App. 1988). The rationale behind this exception to the 
general rule is that '(m)arital property' encompasses all of the assets of 
every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P. 2d 820, 824 (Utah 
App. 1989) quoting Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988), 
and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide the 
property equitably, regardless of its source or time of acquisition. Noble, 
761 P. 2d at 1373. Thus, there is no fixed formula for the distribution of 
marital property, but, instead, the trial court has the power to divide property 
and income so that the parties may readjust their separate lives to their new 
circumstances as well as possible. Munns, 790 P. 2d at 119; Moon, 790 P. 
2d at 56; Weston. 773 P. 2d at 410-11." 
In Dunn v. Dunn, r g 
other things, a professional corporation. The corporation was established during the 
marriage and all of the assets were contributed by the husband who chose to work sixty 
(60) to seventy (70) hours per week. The wife was left with the responsibility of managing 
the household accounts and was left without the companionship and domestic 
contributioi is of the husband. Shew
 p 'business • held 
that her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth and practice of the business. 
The court then determined that this was a marital asset. In the instant case, the trust was 
created during the marriage and the majority of the parties assets were placed in the trust 
and the wife took care of the children and took care of the household so that the husband 
could devote his time and effort to his employment as a Panama Canal Sea Captain and 
to maintaining and enhancing the investments. 
In 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals decided the case of Watson v. Watson, 837 
P. 2d 1 (Utah 1992), and dealt with the issues of corporate property, premarital property 
and alimony. The court cited Colman v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782 (Utah App. 1987), for the 
requirements necessary to set aside a corporate entity under the alter ego doctrine. That 
quote follows: 
"To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two 
circumstances must be shown: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership 
that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few 
individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity." 
The income tax returns, the testimony of Mr. Endrody and the memorandum 
decision issued by the District Judge clearly show undisputed fact that the defendant was 
the Endrody Trust and the Endrody Ranch and defendant used all of his income to 
augment, supplement and develop the trust property. 
The Watson case also dealt with premarital property and the court stated the 
following: 
"Premarital property, gifts and inheritances may be viewed as separate 
property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that each 
party retain the separate property brought to the marriage. However, the 
rule i[s] not invariable." 
The court then quoted Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), for the 
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following rule of law: 
"In appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be awarded property which 
the other spouse brought into the marriage. The rationale behind this 
exception to the general rule is that '(m)arital property' encompasses all of 
the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and 
from whatever source derived,' Sorensen v. Sorensen. 769 P. 2d 820, 824 
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 
1988), and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, 
divide the property equitably regardless of its source or time of acquisition." 
In Dunn, the court stated that pre-marital property may lose its separate distinction 
where parties have commingled it into the marital estate. In this case, plaintiff contends 
and the Trial Court agreed that the defendant treated the property as his own, that he 
could return as trustee whenever he wanted to and that his income had been used to 
augment the trust and that trust property and marital property had been commingled. As 
set forth in the facts, title to the property was in the name of defendant and his parents and 
then changed to the trust; one of the homes was purchased prior to the creation of the trust 
and placed in the trust during the marriage, and it is important to note that the Trial Court 
did not determine how the equipment and cattle got into the trust nor how trust property 
was distinguished from marital property. There was no evidence submitted by the 
defendant that anyone put anything into the trust other than the defendant. Defendant 
stated at the trial, that from the time the trust was created until 1991 he treated the 
operation of the trust property as his own (Tr. 92) and admits that he was the only person 
who paid any money into the trust (Tr. 78). Defendant admits that no one paid for any of 
their shares in the Endrody Trust (Tr. 71) and this leads to the conclusion that any shares 
delivered to any beneficiary were delivered without consideration. The trust agreement 
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provides, among other things, that the trustee may do the following: 
"To do all acts, to institute all such proceedings and exercise all rights, 
powers, and privileges that an absolute owner of property would have the 
right to do, subject always to the discharge of the trustees fiduciary duties. 
The enumeration of certain powers in this agreement shall not limit the 
general or implied powers of the trustee, except those powers expressly 
subject to the beneficiaries direction or approval." (P-9) 
The trust agreement also provides that the trustee could only be removed by a 
majority vote of the beneficiaries and that the trust agreement could be amended by the 
majority of the shares in the trust. At the time of trial, the defendant still had the majority 
of the shares in the trust and could determine who the trustee was at all times, and from 
the inception of the trust until the time the divorce was filed, the defendant did what he 
wanted regarding the trust and treated all of the trust property as his sole and separate 
property. There is evidence throughout the trial which demonstrates that defendant 
treated the property as his own. Exhibit "A" is attached to the trust and is supposed to 
contain all of the trust property. This exhibit only contains the ranch property. The three 
(3) homes acquired by the parties together with the five (5) acres of real property were 
never listed as part of the trust or attached to the original trust document. The homes and 
real property were deeded to the trust in the conveyances, and said deeds are the only 
documents showing what property was placed in the trust. Defendant contended that the 
cattle and machinery belonged to the trust and the court found that was true, however, 
defendant never submitted any documentary evidence showing any cattle or machinery 
being placed in the trust. 
The evidence at trial was replete with violations of the trust. Defendant admitted 
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that he sold real property in violation of the trust agreement (Tr. 123, 124). Defendant 
admitted that he mortgaged trust property in violation of the trust agreement (Tr. 126). 
Defendant admitted that his resignation as trustee was not done in accordance with the 
trust agreement (Tr. 126,128,129,131). Defendant then testified that the trust is really 
an in-house set of rules that the beneficiaries can amend (Tr. 125, 131). Defendant 
testified that he had a majority of the shares of the trust and that a majority of the shares 
could amend the trust (Tr. 136). 
Even if the court determines that some of the property which is part of the Endrody 
Trust was premarital or separate, this conclusion does not place said separate property 
beyond the trial courts reach in an equitable property division. This court may award an 
interest in said property to the plaintiff as part of an alimony award. Weaver v. Weaver. 
442 P. 2d 928 (Utah 1968). The court could also determine that the trust property should 
be sold and defendant given credit for the premarital property and the balance should be 
divided between the parties. The plaintiff simply cannot understand why the court would 
not even consider awarding her the home which was acquired in the name of Lazslo and 
Carolyn Endrody during the marriage and transferred to the trust when the trust was 
created. 
The evidence at trial showed that the defendant took an early retirement from the 
Panama Canal Commission and Masters, Mates and Pilots after the divorce was filed. He 
did that in order to decrease his income from approximately $10,000 per month to 
approximately $2,500 per month. In such a situation, the court may achieve equity by 
awarding premarital property or separate property to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Bailev. 
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745 P. 2d 830 (Utah App. 1987). Since the time the divorce was filed, the defendant has 
sold one (1) of the homes, which was part of the trust property, and has appointed his 
daughter (by a previous marriage), Patty Heinz, to be the trustee of the Endrody Trust and 
has made transfers of trust shares and has done other things in an effort to dissipate the 
marital assets. He claims he has retired as trustee of the Endrody Trust and has retired 
from operating the Endrody Ranch and will not operate Endrody Trucking, and that his only 
income is his retirement. All of these facts evidence an intent to avoid an equitable 
distribution of the marital property and plaintiff is asking this Court to do equity by treating 
all of the property as marital property. The evidence is clear that defendant will become 
trustee of the trust and operate the ranch and become president of Endrody Trucking and 
seek other employment after the appeal has been concluded. 
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPUTE INCOME 
TO DEFENDANT BASED UPON HIS HISTORICAL EARNINGS AND 
AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY CONSISTENT THEREWITH. 
The Trial Court agreed that the defendant was making approximately $120,000 per 
year at the time the divorce complaint was filed (see Memorandum Decision). 
Disregarding this obvious evidence, the Trial Court awarded the plaintiff alimony based 
on defendant's retirement income of $2,500 per month, thereby awarding plaintiff $300 
per month alimony. The Court of Appeals has often held that income can be imputed to 
a party based on historical earnings. An analysis of imputation of income is set forth in Hill 
v. HilL 841 P. 2d 722 (Utah App. 1994). In the HjN case, the Court of Appeals stated that 
the trial court may impute gross income if it examines a parties historical and current 
earnings to determine if under-employment or over-employment exists. The Court of 
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Appeals also said that the trial court's findings must address the critical question of 
whether the drop in earnings was voluntary. In the instant case, the Trial Court chose not 
to impute income to the defendant in spite of overwhelming evidence that the defendant 
was voluntarily under-employed. Defendant's income was reduced from $10,000 per 
month to approximately $2,500 per month at a time when plaintiff demonstrated to the Trial 
Court that she needed approximately $2,000 per month on which to live. 
The defendant admitted that he discontinued all activities which would grant him 
income because of the divorce. In contrast, plaintiff testified that she was trying to get a 
secretarial degree so that she could do some work even though she testified that she did 
not work during the marriage and that she stayed home and took care of the family. She 
also testified at the time of the divorce, that she could not find work and could not even get 
a loan (Tr. 210). At that same time (during the divorce process), Mr. Endrody received a 
$7,000 federal income tax refund which was a result of the filing of joint returns (Tr. 212) 
and plaintiff did not receive any of that money. He sold $30,000 worth of cattle and also 
sold a home netting $36,135 and controlled all of the parties assets. Plaintiff testified that 
she was in need of alimony, that she had no medical insurance (Tr. 217) and that she was 
taking medications on a daily basis (Tr. 220). The medications she was taking including 
the following: flexeril for spasms, corguard for blood pressure, Zantac for ulcers, and elavil 
for depression. She testified that she could not get a job at that time (Tr. 222) and that the 
constant threats to evict her from the family home had caused her depression and medical 
problems (Tr. 231). It is plaintiffs contention that the Court of Appeals should determine 
that the Trial Judge abused its discretion by not properly imputing income to the defendant 
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and the matter should be remanded to the District Court to impute income consistent with 
the evidence presented at trial, and make a proper alimony award. 
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING DEFENDANT 
TO ACCOUNT FOR PROPERTY SOLD DURING THE DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
The Trial Court issued an order on April 19, 1993 that the defendant had sold 
approximately $30,000 worth of cattle in violation of the Trial Court's previous order. The 
Trial Court then found that the defendant was in contempt of court for selling the cattle and 
charged him $810 in attorney's fees. The Trial Court did not make the defendant account 
for the proceeds. The findings of fact and the memorandum decision of the Trial Court did 
not determine why the court did not include the $30,000 amount as part of the marital 
estate. During the divorce proceedings one of the homes acquired by the parties with 
marital assets was placed in the Endrody Trust and sold by the trustee of the trust, netting 
$36,135.00. The Trial Court did not make the defendant account for those proceeds and 
did not set forth in his findings of fact or memorandum decision why those proceeds should 
not be accounted for. The plaintiff is requesting that the Court of Appeals require the Trial 
Court to determine that these assets are part of the marital estate and award plaintiff her 
share of same. 
IV. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT PRECLUDED THE PLAINTIFF FROM 
RECEIVING ASSETS ACCUMULATED DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
The Trial Court spent a great deal of time in its memorandum decision discussing 
various cases which relate to prenuptial agreements. The findings of fact and 
memorandum decision submitted by the Trial Court demonstrate that the Trial Court found 
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the improvements to the Endrody Ranch, the purchases of the homes and real property, 
and the purchases of the cattle and equipment were accomplished with marital assets. 
The Trial Court then awarded plaintiff the benefit of certain shares to be held in a 
constructive trust by the defendant. This is virtually a worthless award, because the 
defendant controlled the trust, can amend the trust at will, can issue additional shares, and 
the Trial Court does not explain how the prenuptial agreement allows the court to award 
the defendant possession and control of almost all of the parties marital assets. 
It is plaintiff's position that even if the prenuptial agreement is valid, the property 
which plaintiff has proved is marital property can still be distributed by the Trial Court in 
accordance with justice and equity. 
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT REQUESTED AT TRIAL. 
In this case, the Trial Court determined that the plaintiffs evidence at trial showed 
that she had incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $35,602.25 and costs in the amount 
of $1,431.50. The evidence also showed that from the time the first temporary restraining 
order and order to show cause was issued on March 21, 1991, until the trial, the court 
issued an additional twelve (12) orders on an interim basis. Most of these orders and 
interim hearings were scheduled of the request of the defendant. As an example, on June 
20,1991, the defendant asked the court to evict plaintiff from the family home, (see order 
dated July 9,1991). The court records also show that defendant hired and dismissed two 
(2) attorneys before deciding to represent himself. The court determined that plaintiff was 
entitled to $15,000 in attorney's fees and reduced the fees by $22,033.75 without 
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explanation. The Trial Court obviously found plaintiff was in need or the court would not 
have made the award. In a divorce case, the Trial Court has discretion to award attorney's 
fees. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). Such an award is usually based upon 
need, and the Trial Court must support the award with adequate findings detailing the 
reasonableness of the amount awarded and the amount of the receiving party. Porco v. 
Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). The Court of Appeals also held that where the 
Trial Court chooses to reduce the amount of fees requested, the court must make findings 
justifying the reduction. Rappleve v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993). It is 
plaintiffs request that the Court of Appeals instruct the trial court to award her all of the 
fees requested because the fees were reasonable and because of the unwarranted 
conduct of defendant. It is plaintiffs contention, that the court should have awarded her 
the entire $35,602.25 plus costs of court in the sum of $1,431.50. 
VI. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
ON APPEAL. 
The Court of Appeals has authority to award attorney's fees and usually does so 
based on whether or not the party requesting same prevails on appeal. Bell v. Bell 
810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990). In this 
case, the plaintiff certainly showed a need for attorney's fees at the trial level and is 
requesting such an award on appeal. This request is consistent with previous opinions of 
the Court of Appeals. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court issued a memorandum decision setting forth his reasons for 
determining why plaintiff should not receive her share of the marital assets. The court 
agrees with the plaintiff by stating that the parties income and contributions improved an 
$80,000 piece of property to $437,000. The court agrees with the plaintiff that marital 
assets were used to purchase three (3) homes and five (5) acres of unimproved property, 
together with equipment and cattle. The court then states in its memorandum decision, 
under the heading, "rent to be paid by the trust", that since the defendant made oral 
agreements with the trust relating to rents or leases that those agreements were valid, 
without additional documentation, (see pp 22 of the memorandum decision). On page 22 
of the memorandum decision, the Trial Court also stated the following: 
"The evidence has convinced the court that the rental agreements were 
legitimate bargains between the parties and the trust, even though defendant 
acted on both sides of the transactions." 
These pronouncement, by the defendant, acting on both sides of the transactions, led the 
Trial Court to the conclusion that he should award the plaintiff shares, in a trust controlled 
by the defendant and amendable at the whim of the defendant, making said shares 
virtually worthless. Before the Court of Appeals was established and set down guidelines 
in divorce cases, the type of decision made here was almost impossible to appeal. Now 
that guidelines exist, requiring the Trial Court to substantiate such a decision, the plaintiff 
can, at least, attack the evidence used by the Trial Court regarding the steps taken in 
reaching its conclusion. In this case, that type of evidence, aside from the statement of 
the defendant, acting on both sides of the transaction, simply does not exist. 
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The failure of the Trial Court to award plaintiff any property and the decision of the 
Trial Court allowing the defendant to hide behind the trust, makes it impossible for plaintiff 
to gain access to any funds or even collect her attorney's fees. She has no money, no 
family home and no place to go. In contrast, the defendant has control of two (2) homes, 
the unimproved real property and the property known as the Endrody Ranch, and is 
probably in the process of resuming his employment. Every case reviewed by this writer 
concerning divorce proceedings discussed the wide latitude and discretion given to the 
Trial Judge to take into account all types of property, pre-marital, inherited or gifted, to 
make an award in accordance with justice and equity. The award made in this case 
certainly has nothing to do with justice or equity. 
It is plaintiffs request that the Court of Appeals reverse and remand with 
instructions to the Trial Court to do the following: 
1. Award plaintiff one-half (1/4) of the property accumulated by the parties 
during the marriage. This would include trust property. 
2. Impute income to defendant based on historical earnings and award 
plaintiff alimony consistent therewith. 
3. Award plaintiff property equal in value to one-half (!4) of the property 
defendant and his trust sold during the divorce proceedings. 
4. Award plaintiff the attorney's fees she incurred prosecuting this matter 
through trial. 
5. Determine a reasonable attorney's fee for pursuing this appeal and 
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award plaintiff that amount. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of March, 1995. 
MICHAEL" 
for THE PARK FIRM 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 4-true and correct copy of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT was placed in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid on the 3rd day of April, 1995, addressed to: MICHAEL W. 
DAY, SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE, P.O. Box 400, St. George, UT 84771 and 
LASZLO ENDRODY, P.O. Box 1083_CedaLO_ity, UT 84720. 
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FILED 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH 9a 5EP ZJ. AH 10 17 JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE 
B*-
dff°Mffl .UNTY 
KPfr 
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY 
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee 
of the ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY 
HEINZ, individually, ENDRODY 
TRUCKING, INC., a Utah 
corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY, 
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A. 
ENDRODY, LINDA S. M. ENDRODY, 
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. ENDRODY, 
DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL McGARVEY, 
MATILDA McGARVEY, MICKLOS ENDRODY, 
MADELEIN L. ENDRODY, HEIDI 
MICHELLE ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES 
ENDRODY, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
Civil No. 914900027 
This matter came before the court for trial on August 25, 
1993. The parties were present. Plaintiff was represented by 
Michael and James Park; Laszlo Endrody Jr., defendant, 
represented himself and the remaining served defendants 
(hereinafter the trust defendants) were represented by Michael 
Day. The court heard evidence and argument and took the matter 
under submission. The court now finds the following facts.and 
enters the following memorandum decision and order(s). 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in the Panama Canal 
Zone on April 11, 1975. Plaintiff was a member of the U.S. 
military prior to the marriage and expected to make the military 
her career. Defendant, a former sea captain, had been employed 
as a Panama Canal pilot since early 1975. 
Two days before the marriage, the parties signed an 
"Antenuptial Property Agreement". The document was prepared by a 
lawyer in Panama hired by Mr. Endrody. It was signed in Panama. 
Plaintiff testified that she signed the agreement voluntarily and 
no one made any threats or forced her to do so. However, she 
"just assumed" that if she refused to sign the agreement, there 
would be no marriage. Plaintiff had no lawyer representing her 
at the time. 
The agreement, dated April 9, 1975, states that plaintiff 
owned $3,000 worth of personal property at the time of the 
marriage and that the defendant owned "...real and personal 
property in Iron County, Utah, which consists of the Endrody 
Ranch including its cattle, its accounts, and equipment, which is 
valued at $600,000." The agreement further provides that the 
parties intend that all real and personal property on the Endrody 
Ranch in Iron County, including accounts, cattle and machinery 
would remain the separate property of the defendant, 
".-.regardless of any loans or payments made on the ranch, 
accounts, cattle, or machinery during the marriage." All 
furnishings and household goods in the defendant's home in the 
Canal Zone were designated as the separate property of the 
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plaintiff. Plaintiff admits that prior to the signing of the 
Agreement she had visited the Ranch in Iron County and had seen 
the cattle, buildings, fields, corrals and other improvements on 
the property. She knew which property was being referenced in 
the Agreement. 
The Endrody Ranch is a piece of real estate in Iron County, 
Utah, comprised of about 643.77 acres with various associated 
water rights. The parties agree that the Ranch was purchased by 
defendant's parents in 1970, some 5 years before the marriage of 
these parties. Title to the Ranch was actually in the names of 
the defendant and his parents jointly. However, it was the 
parents' money which was used to make the $25,000 down payment on 
the $80,000 purchase price. Thereafter the parents paid the 
property off in annual payments. The property was still being 
paid off at the time the parties married. 
Prior to and following the marriage, the defendant farmed 
the land of the Endrody Ranch, raised livestock thereon and spent 
considerable money and time improving the property. The 
defendant entered into a rental agreement with his parents which 
required him to pay them rent for the use of the property. The 
rent payments were almost sufficient to meet the annual payments 
as they came due. The parents were required to add small sums to 
the rent proceeds to make those annual payments. The defendant 
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used large amounts of his earnings during the marriage to pay the 
rent on the Ranch, to install improvements such as sprinklers and 
corrals, and to clear and level additional acreage for 
cultivation. He also bought and exchanged many items of farm 
equipment both prior to and during the marriage, often using his 
earnings from the Panama Canal and the Ranch to pay for the 
items. All the proceeds of the Ranch were used to improve it and 
to pay for the required supplies and equipment. 
In 1984, the defendant, as trustee, and his parents as 
trustors, entered into a written trust agreement by which the 
Endrody Trust was formed. The trustors conveyed their interest 
in the Endrody Ranch and its water rights to the defendant as 
trustee. The Trust is an express, voluntary, revocable inter 
vivos trusts Each of the grantors retained, during his or her 
lifetime, the right to revoke the Trust. The Trust had as 
beneficiaries several members of the Endrody family, including 
defendant's children, defendant and plaintiff. Each beneficiary 
was given a certain number of shares. The plaintiff received 24 
shares and the defendant received 1,433, out of about 2,000 
shares. At the time of trial the defendant still controlled 1101 
shares out of a total of 2070 shares issued by the Trust. The 
plaintiff did not object to the formation of the Trust or the 
transfer of the Ranch to the Trust, as she thought that the Ranch 
4 
was the defendant's separate property. The plaintiff did not 
join in the creation of the Trust, either as a grantor or as a 
trustee. 
The trust agreement provides that the trustee may exercise 
broad powers over the property in the Trust and may treat the 
property as though he were the owner thereof, subject to the 
discharge of his fiduciary duties as trustee. The agreement 
further provides that upon divorce of a beneficiary who is a 
lineal descendant of the trustors from a beneficiary who is not a 
lineal descendant of the trustors, the shares of the non 
descendant beneficiary are returned to the Trust and distributed 
to the descendants of the divorced couple, per stirpes. 
Therefor, at the time of trial and according the terms of the 
Trust, plaintiff was no longer a beneficiary as her shares went 
to Michael and Linda Endrody, the parties' teenage children, at 
the time this court entered its bifurcated divorce decree. 
The defendant's undivided 1/3 interest in the Ranch was 
never transferred into the Trust, although defendant assumed that 
he had given up his interest by executing the Trust Agreement. 
At the time of trial, the defendant still held that interest 
outside the provisions of the Trust Agreement. 
After the creation of the Trust, the defendant continued to 
make improvements to the Ranch, to buy and sell farm equipment, 
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to supply the seed, labor and electrical power needs of the 
Ranch, to farm and raise livestock, and to pay rental payments to 
the Trust for the use of the land and water. The income 
generated by those activities was not the property of the Trust. 
The parties and the Trust filed separate tax returns, and for the 
years 1987 through 1990 those returns indicate that the farm was 
losing large amounts of money and the defendant was using his 
earnings from the Canal to pay many of the costs associated with 
running the Ranch and buying the equipment and supplies needed to 
do so. 
During the marriage, the defendant's annual income went from 
about $24,000 to over $120,000. The plaintiff did not work 
during the marriage outside the home. She was fully occupied 
with the duties of managing the family, caring for the children 
and keeping the home fires burning while the defendant was in 
Panama, often months at a time. The defendant sent all his 
earnings home to his father, who handled the defendant's banking. 
The father would see that the plaintiff was given enough money to 
feed and care for the family until the defendant came home on one 
of his long leaves. The defendant would then pay any outstanding 
bills and stock up the family cupboard before going back to 
Panama. During these leaves, the defendant spent considerable 
time working on the Ranch, both as his second job and as his 
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hobby. The defendant admits that he expected to inherit the 
Ranch upon the death of his parents prior to the creation of the 
trust. Since he has the majority of the shares issued in the 
Trust, he has treated the Ranch as his own property throughout 
the marriage and has spent a great deal of money and time on 
improvements to the property. As of April 17, 1992, the Ranch 
and improvements thereon, including sprinklers, wells, water 
distribution lines, buildings, two mobile homes, corrals and 
fences, were appraised as having a fair market value of $437,000. 
The Ranch is currently leased out to third parties who raise and 
harvest some hay for the Trust and pay the entire power bill on 
the premises, including that used to water Trust hay, in exchange 
for the use of the property. The defendant no longer acts as 
manager of the Ranch, and has resigned as trustee of the Trust 
and his daughter by prior marriage has been properly appointed as 
trustee. Since defendant is still the majority shareholder in 
the Trust and his daughter is the current trustee, the court is 
convinced that the defendant could resume the position of trustee 
at will. 
The farm machinery and equipment being used or located on 
the Ranch has been bought by defendant from his earnings during 
the marriage, except for the 150 hp JD 4630 tractor, the JD 3960 
Harvester, the offset disc bought in 1970, the flatbed trailer 
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turned over to Endrody Trucking and the horse trailer belonging 
to Linda. Defendant testified that he had traded in machinery he 
owned prior to the marriage which was separate property and 
covered by the premarital agreement but the evidence thereon is 
speculative and unconvincing. The defendant was unable to supply 
specific incidents or evidence as to values of the alleged 
separate property and any separate character of that property is 
untraceable and has been obliterated by commingling, augmentation 
and improvement using marital funds and assets. It is 
undisputed, and clearly established by the evidence, that the 
defendant's earnings during the marriage from the farm and from 
the Panama Canal employment are marital property. 
During the marriage the defendant was acquiring retirement 
benefits from his employment with the Panama Canal Commission. 
Those benefits began to accrue prior to the marriage. The 
parties have agreed that the Court should promulgate a qualified 
domestic relations order to be forwarded to the Commission so 
that a proper calculation can be done as to how much of the 
benefit was accrued during the marriage. Plaintiff is entitled 
to one half of that benefit accrued during the marriage. 
Defendant has now retired from the Panama Canal and currently 
receives a monthly benefit of $2442 per month. 
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During the marriage the parties or the Trust acquired 
additional properties which present issues in this case. In 
1982, the parties bought a home in Cedar City which they paid for 
with marital funds. The title to the home was taken by the 
plaintiff and the defendant as trustees for the two minor 
children of the parties, Michael and Linda. After the Trust was 
created, the Cedar City house was transferred into the Trust, 
with the agreement of both the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Plaintiff received 70 additional shares in the Trust upon her 
agreement to transfer the Cedar City house to the Trust. 
Thereafter, the parties paid rent to the Trust for the use of the 
house. The defendant has occupied this home during these 
proceedings and is being assessed rent by the Trust. 
During the marriage the defendant bought 5 acres of land in 
Enoch City which was paid for with Trust funds and deeded to the 
defendant as trustee for the Trust. 
During the marriage the defendant bought a home in Enoch 
City, in which plaintiff has resided by order of the court during 
the pendency of these proceedings. That home was paid for by 
Trust funds and title was taken by defendant as trustee for the 
Trust. During the time the parties resided in that home, they 
paid rent to the trust for the use of the premises. Patty Heinz, 
the current trustee of the Trust, has testified that once this 
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divorce case is decided, the Trust will seek the ouster of the 
plaintiff from the Enoch home and will hold defendant responsible 
for all losses the Trust has suffered during the time the 
plaintiff has occupied the home without paying the required rent. 
The 1969 mobile home located on the Ranch is a marital 
asset, it having been purchased during the marriage by the 
parties and paid for with marital funds. The larger mobile home 
located on the Ranch, and occupied by defendant's mother, is not 
the property of the parties, but belongs to Matilda Endrody. 
During the marriage the Trust bought a home on Blue Sky 
Drive in Enoch City which was paid for with Trust funds and for 
the use of which the Trust collected rent. That home has been 
sold be the Trust, through Patty Heinz as trustee, during the 
pendency of these proceedings to reduce the debt of the Trust. 
Plaintiff is currently enrolled in college and working 
toward a secretarial degree. She hopes to be able to enter the 
work force after that in a secretarial or office manager type 
job. Plaintiff suffers from several illnesses and takes various 
medications which limit the types of work she can do. She last 
worked just prior to this marriage. Her degree will require at 
least 2 years to complete. 
Defendant also hopes to return to the work force following 
the resolution of this case, although he will not be able to 
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return to the Panama Canal because of his physical condition. He 
hopes to find employment in the merchant marine as a master or 
mate. However, he is currently caring for and has temporary 
custody of the two teenage children of the parties. Michael is 
quite ill and requires constant care. Child care would create 
problems if he were to go back to sea as that line of work 
requires lengthy absences. Plaintiff has indicated that she is 
not interested in taking physical custody of the children at this 
time but would do so if anything happened to the defendant. The 
parties have agreed that the court should award joint custody to 
them, with physical custody to the defendant and reasonable 
rights of visitation to the plaintiff. 
During the marriage the defendant set up a corporation known 
as Endrody Trucking. The initial contribution to that company 
and several later contributions were made from marital assets. 
The court finds that the stock or other interest in that 
corporation held by either of the parties is marital property. 
The parties acquired two pick up trucks and one Cadillac 
during the marriage. The parties have stipulated that the 
Cadillac is the plaintiff's separate property and the two pick up 
trucks belong to the Trust. The 1978 Chrysler Cordoba automobile 
is a marital asset having a value of $300. 
At time of trial the parties own no cattle in their own 
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name. At the time the case was filed, the parties owned a large 
herd of cattle. During the pendency of these proceedings the 
defendant has sold those cattle in violation of the court's 
restraining order. The defendant was found in contempt by the 
court following a hearing held December 14, 1992. The penalty 
determination was stayed, as the court wanted the advantage of 
hearing all the evidence before deciding on the appropriate 
penalty for the sale of the cattle. 
During the trial, plaintiff's evidence showed that she had 
incurred attorney fees in the total amount of $35,602.25 and 
costs in the total amount of $1431.50. The defendant presented 
no evidence on his attorney fees, nor did he present evidence 
regarding the reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred by 
plaintiff. 
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
Plaintiff contends that the premarital agreement entered 
into by the parties should be invalidated because she signed it 
under coercion and without full disclosure. The courts of this 
State have clearly held that antenuptial agreements are valid and 
enforceable with certain exceptions. Such agreements are 
validated if the evidence demonstrates that the agreement was 
entered into voluntarily without coercion or fraud, and if there 
was material disclosure of assets. [See Nielson v, Nielson. 780 
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p.2d 1264; Hunk v. Huck, 734 P. 2d 417; Berman v, Berman^ 749 
P.2d 1271.] 
The evidence in this case demonstrates no coercion, fraud or 
involuntariness. Plaintiff testified that prior to the signing 
of the agreement she was aware of the Ranch and its improvements, 
having visited there herself. The question of a premarital 
agreement came up for the first time in Panama just before the 
marriage was to take place but the plaintiff testified there were 
no threats, no ultimatum, no duress or coercion. She assumed 
that there would be no marriage if she refused to sign the 
agreement but the defendant made no such statement or indication. 
Further, plaintiff had no objection to signing the agreement as 
she assumed that the Ranch would be the separate property of the 
defendant after the marriage, just as her belongings would 
continue to be hers after the marriage. The burden of proving 
the existence of coercion is born by the plaintiff and she has 
failed to carry that burden in this case. 
The evidence in this case does demonstrate material non-
disclosure, however. The plaintiff argues that the non-
disclosure consists of the overvaluation of the Ranch, its 
cattle, its accounts and equipment. The defendant admits that 
the figure of $600,000 was not accurate at the time of the 
agreement. He admits that the property was worth far less than 
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that amount. The court holds, however, that an error of that 
type does not constitute material non-disclosure. 
The plaintiff was familiar with the property included in the 
agreement. There was no confusion, nor was she misled, by the 
overvaluation of that property. She agreed that the defendant 
could keep the described property as his separate property even 
at the value he gave it. The purpose of the requirement of full, 
material disclosure is to provide the agreeing party a full 
opportunity to assess what he or she is giving up- by signing the 
agreement- Obviously if the property is greatly undervalued 
during disclosure the other party has been deprived of the 
ability to properly determine what is being given up. However, 
when the value of the property has been overstated, and the 
agreeing party decides to sign anyway, he or she has had adequate 
disclosure to make a reasoned decision. The law does not require 
absolute accuracy in disclosure. The overvaluation of the Ranch 
was not material non-disclosure as the court can presume that if 
the true value of the property had been disclosed, being less 
than the amount stated, the plaintiff would have entered into the 
agreement all the more readily, as she would have been giving up 
less than she chose to give up in this agreement. 
The court finds, however, that the agreement executed by 
these parties did not make the required material disclosure as to 
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that portion of the document which provided: 
"The parties intend and desire that all real and personal 
property on the Endrody Ranch in Iron County, including 
accounts, cattle and machinery shall remain the separate 
property of the prospective husband, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR. , 
regardless of any loans or payments made on the ranch, 
accounts, cattle, or machinery during the marriage." 
No where in the agreement is there any indication of the 
nature of the indebtedness on the Ranch or other assets or the 
nature of any accounts it may hold or owe. In this case the 
evidence is persuasive that throughout this marriage the 
defendant was using large amounts of his earnings, which were 
clearly marital funds, to improve the Ranch, to buy cattle and 
machinery and to supply the farming needs of the Ranch 
enterprise. The effect of this arrangement is that the Ranch "is 
now an asset which has escalated in value from $80,000 at the 
time of its purchase prior to the marriage to $437,000 at the 
last appraisal. The defendant has effectively provided himself a 
way to transform marital earnings into his separate property, at 
will, be simply using the money in connection with the Ranch. 
The agreement does not reveal that such was the contemplation of 
the parties. Nor is there any evidence that the plaintiff ever 
knew of or agreed to such an outcome. Failure of the defendant 
to reveal that he intended to make significant improvements to 
his separate property from marital assets and then to claim the 
improvements as his own separate property constituted material 
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non-disclosure. 
In addition, the enforcement of the above quoted portion of 
the agreement would be substantially unfair under the 
circumstances in this case. Antenuptial agreements, or some 
portion thereof, may be invalidated because of unfairness. [See 
Nielson V. Nielsen, and Berman v. Berman. cited above.] During 
the marriage the defendant earned well over $100,000 per year for 
several years from his employment. The evidence shows that much 
of that money was spent improving the Ranch and its assets, which 
the defendant expected individually to inherit,, own or control 
upon the death of his parents. Were the court to enforce this 
provision of the agreement, it would result in an unfair result 
since the controlling interest in the Ranch is now held by a 
Trust controlled largely by the defendant. If the machinery and 
other personal property on the Ranch, including its accounts, 
cattle, and machinery were also to be held the separate property 
of the defendant, the plaintiff would walk away from 17 years of 
marriage with precious little and the defendant would have 
amassed a considerable fortune using marital funds. Such a 
result is not fair and was not within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of the agreement. 
Accordingly, the court holds that the provisions of the 
Antenuptial Property Agreement according separate property status 
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to personal property on the Ranch, including accounts, cattle, 
and machinery regardless of any loans or payments made thereon 
during the marriage is unenforceable. Further the court holds 
that any improvements to real property of the Ranch during the 
marriage which were paid for with marital funds are not made 
defendant's separate property by the agreement for the reasons 
cited above. 
The court must next consider whether this holding 
invalidates the entire premarital agreement. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held, in Nielson V, Nielson^ : 
"Where the offending provision [of an antenuptial 
agreement] is separable from the rest of the contract, the 
non-offending provisions are enforceable." 
The court finds that the offending provision in the 
agreement at hand is separable from the remaining portions of the 
agreement. Therefore, the agreement is declared valid and 
enforceable except as to the offending provisions identified 
above. 
In applying the agreement to the facts in this case, the 
defendant's interest in the real property which constituted the 
Ranch at the time of the marriage would be the separate property 
of the defendant, as would any increase in value of that property 
attributable solely to the independent forces of the market place 
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and the economy, including inflationary factors1. [See 24 Am. 
Jur. 2d Section 891, p. 872; Dunn v. Dunn, 802 p.2d 1314, 1320 
(Utah 1990); Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah 1990)3 
However, any increase in value attributable to the expenditure of 
marital funds on repairs, improvements, new acquisitions or the 
like is a marital asset subject to division by this court. (See 
24 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 892; Burt v. Burt. cited above; Dunn v. 
Dunn, cited above.) Likewise, any interest in personal property 
held by defendant at the time of the marriage and which was 
maintained separate and paid for without the application of 
marital funds, would remain the separate property of the 
defendant. However, any interest in an item of personal property 
acquired after the marriage and paid for by marital funds would 
xIn Dunn v. Dunn, page 1320, the Court of Appeals held: 
"The general rule is that equity requires that each 
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the 
marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property. 
(Citations omitted) Exceptions to this general rule include 
whether the property has been commingled, whether the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or 
protected the separate property, and whether the distribution 
achieves a fair, just, and equitable result." 
It is clear from the evidence in this case that plaintiff 
has augmented and maintained the property of the defendant by his 
use of marital funds to improve his separate property. In 
addition, this court finds unfair and inequitable a property 
distribution that would leave the defendant with the principle 
assets of the marriage and all the value they have accrued 
because he used marital funds to increase that value during the 
marriage, even though one half of those funds must be attributed 
to the efforts of the plaintiff. 
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be a marital asset, subject to division by the court. 
THE ENDRQDY TRUST 
Much of the litigation in this case has been caused by the 
creation of the Endrody Trust by defendant and his parents on 
October 5, 1984. At the time of the signing of the Trust 
Agreement, the defendant's parents, as trustors, held title to 
2/3 undivided interest in the Ranch. Their interest was 
transferred to the Trust. The remaining 1/3 undivided interest 
was held by defendant. That interest was never deeded to the 
Trust. Plaintiff now attacks the Trust and has even joined the 
Trust, its trustee, and some of its current beneficiaries as 
defendants in this lawsuit. The plaintiff has been unable to 
direct the court to any authority which would allow this court to 
invalidate or set aside the Trust under the circumstances of this 
case. 
The plaintiff's primary complaint is that the defendant has 
placed marital assets in the Trust. Even if such is the case, it 
is no basis for setting aside a Trust created by third party 
trustors for the benefit of the parties, as well as other 
beneficiaries unrelated to this divorce action. A court cannot 
invade a trust established for a lawful purpose where there is no 
showing that the trust was created by fraud, duress, undue 
influence, or mistake, unless all parties in interest consent 
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properly to the revocation. (See 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 101, P. 
138) The court is required to give effect to the intent of the 
trustors who created the trust, absent such a showing. 
Plaintiff has also pointed to some actions by the defendant 
while serving as trustee as grounds for setting aside the trust. 
The general rule is that a trust does not terminate merely 
because of the misconduct of the trustee, his neglect or 
inability to manage the trust, or inattention to it. (See 76 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Section 106, p. 141.) 
In short the plaintiff has failed to carry her burden to 
show that the Trust should be set aside. Plaintiff urges the 
court to adopt the alter ego doctrine from the law of 
corporations and to apply it in this situation. The court 
declines to do so. However, even if the court were to do so, the 
plaintiff could not prevail. This Trust is obviously not the 
alter ego of the defendant, even though he enjoyed broad powers 
as trustee and majority shareholder of the Trust. The evidence 
demonstrates that the Trust included property of other parties 
which was managed by defendant for the benefit of the Trust and 
its beneficiaries. Both parties admit that they paid rent for 
the use of Trust properties. Plaintiff even admits that she 
consented to the contribution of the Cedar City house to the 
Trust. She agreed to take shares in the Trust in return for 
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whatever interest she might have in that house. The Trust was 
treated by all concerned as a separate legal entity, the proper 
forms were observed, and the defendant was under a continuing 
duty as trustee to perform properly his fiduciary duties. The 
defendant bought and sold and financed and paid for property as 
trustee of the trust and there is no showing that he commingled 
the affairs of the Trust and his personal affairs. 
Therefor the court holds that the Trust is a valid inter 
vivos trust and that the claims of the plaintiff against the 
Trust, its beneficiaries, and its trustee are unsupported. Those 
claims are hereby ordered dismissed. Accordingly the property 
held by the Trust, including the 2/3 interest in the Ranch, the 
Cedar City house, the 5 acres in Enoch, the Enoch house, and the 
personal property belonging to the Trust are not available for 
distribution between these parties as marital assets as those 
items of property belong to a third party. (See 24 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Section 896.) 
However, the court also holds that the shares in the Trust 
held by the defendant as beneficiary are marital property in view 
of the fact that defendant acquired those shares during the 
marriage, has increased the value of those shares during the 
marriage by the use of marital funds and the application of large 
amounts of time and effort otherwise belonging to the marriage, 
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and has returned all earnings from the Ranch to the Ranch and the 
Trust, to the exclusion of plaintiff. The court hereby orders 
that 550 1/2 of the defendant's shares in the Trust are held by 
him Subject to a constructive trust imposed by this court. He is 
to hold only title to those shares in trust for the plaintiff and 
she is awarded the full benefit and use of those shares, 
including voting rights and the right to any property 
distribution attributable to those shares. 
RENT PAID TQ THE TRUST 
Inherent in plaintiff's position is the claim that the 
payments of rent which the parties made to the Trust for the use 
of Trust property were somehow improper and constituted 
impermissible augmentation of the Trust with marital property. 
The plaintiff would have the court hold the defendant and the 
Trust responsible for this perceived impropriety. The evidence 
has convinced this court that the rental agreements were 
legitimate bargains between the parties and the Trust, even 
though defendant acted on both sides of the transactions. In 
each instance the parties were granted a leasehold interest in 
the property in question, be it a house or the Ranch. .The 
parties actually paid the rent and were held responsible by the 
Trust for those payments. The court finds that the plaintiff has 
failed to prove that the rents were unreasonable or that they 
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were not given in exchange for a return benefit of comparable 
value which both parties enjoyed. In essence, the Trust was in 
the same position as any other landlord vis-a-vis these parties. 
ENPRQPY TRUCKING CORPORATION 
Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges that the entity 
known as Endrody Trucking (hereinafter "Corp.") is marital 
property. The plaintiff does not allege that the corporate veil 
should be pierced or that the alter ego doctrine should be 
applied in this case. Certainly there has been no evidence 
presented which would justify such action by this court. On the 
other hand, it would appear clear from the evidence that any 
interest of the parties or stock in that Corp., whether acquired 
in the name of the defendant or the plaintiff, must be treated as 
marital property, having been acquired with marital funds. 
RETIREMENT 
The parties have stipulated that the parties are entitled to 
a proportionate share of the retirement benefit that the 
defendant now receives from the Panama Canal Commission. Some of 
the benefit relates to the period before the parties were 
married. The plaintiff is entitled to 1/2 of the benefit 
attributable to the period beginning with the marriage of the 
parties and ending with the defendant's effective retirement 
date. Plaintiff's counsel is to prepare a qualified domestic 
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relations order for signature by the court and to make the 
necessary arrangements with the Commission so that the 
plaintiff's entitlement can be properly calculated and paid 
directly to her. 
CUSTODY AND CHTDD SUPPORT 
In accordance with the stipulation of the parties, the 
parties are hereby awarded joint custody of the two minor 
children of the marriage, with physical custody to the defendant 
and reasonable rights of visitation to the plaintiff. 
The issue of child support is reserved until the court has 
entered its final decision as to the property and debt division 
as detailed hereafter. 
PROPKRTY DIVISION 
The first task of the court in dividing the property in 
dispute is to identify whether any particular item is separate 
property, marital property or property of a third party. The 
court has begun that analysis in entering the rulings set out 
above relating to the Antenuptial Agreement, the Trust, the 
Corp., and other matters. Applying those rulings to the evidence 
in this case, the court now determines that the following items 
are separate property of the parties: 
PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE PROPERTY: 
1. All furnishings now located in the Enoch house 
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except that belonging to Linda Endrody, 
2. The Cadillac automobile, and 
3. All personal items of property identifiable as being 
owned by plaintiff prior to the marriage. 
(The parties stipulated during the trial that the Cadillac and 
the furnishings in the Enoch house could be so treated.) 
DEFENDANT'S SEPARATE PROPERTY: 
1. A 1/3 undivided interest in the Ranch except for any 
increase in value attributable to use of marital funds, 
2. Any equipment, machinery or other personal property 
owned prior to the marriage and used on the Ranch, and 
3. Any equipment, machinery or other personal property 
in which the defendant held an interest at the time of the 
marriage except for any value attributable to the expenditure of 
marital funds. 
The following are items of marital property which should be 
divided equally and fairly between the parties. 
MARITAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES: 
1. Any value of the defendant's 1/3 interest in the 
Ranch attributable to the use of marital funds or assets. 
2. Any farm machinery, equipment or other personal 
property acquired during the marriage. 
3. Any holdings, stock or other interest in the Corp., 
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4. The identified retirement benefit, 
5. Any other vehicles, furnishings, cash, earnings, or 
property not specifically discussed above which were acquired by 
either party during the marriage, 
6. The shares held by defendant in the Trust, the court 
having ordered that 1/2 of the shares in the Trust which are held 
in the name of the defendant as of the time of trial are subject 
to a constructive trust and are held by defendant for the use and 
benefit of plaintiff, 
7. Any tax refunds attributable to any part of the 
period of the marriage, 
8. Any mobile home or trailer acquired during the 
marriage by the parties, except the horse trailer belonging to 
Linda Endrody, 
The court having now determined the law to be applied 
in this case and having entered certain orders herein as to how 
various items of property are to be treated, it now seems 
appropriate to set this matter for further argument or the 
presentation of evidence on the following matters: 
1. The values to be fixed for the various property 
interests identified above for separate and marital property. 
2. The value of the debts and obligations of the 
parties, and whether outstanding debts are chargeable as marital 
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obligations or individual obligations. 
3. The proper division of marital property between 
these parties. 
4. Determination of a proper alimony award after-
property and debts have been valued and divided. 
5. Determination of a proper child support assessment 
after property and debts have been valued and divided. 
6. Determination regarding the assessment of attorney 
fees, after the property and debts have been valued and divided. 
7. Any remaining unresolved issues. 
Accordingly, this matter is ordered set on the Law and 
Motion Calendar on October 4, 1993, at 9:00 AM, in the Iron 
County Courthouse in Parowan, Utah for review and scheduling as 
may become necessary. The plaintiff and defendant are ordered to 
be present at the above time and place along with their counsel. 
The trust defendants need not attend, but may do so if they 
choose, in person ajnd/or by counsel. 
Dated ^J^fe^nofr^ ?Q. 1113 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on this day of September, 
1993, I mailed true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, first class postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
James M. Park, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0765 
Lasslo Endrody, Jr. 
P. 0. Box 1083 
Cedar City, UT 84721-1083 
Michael A. Day, Esq. 
90 East 200 North 
P. 0. Box 400 
St. George, UT 84770 
OdJllkfi, ]0Jk-> 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY 
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the 
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, 
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC. 
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY, 
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A. 
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY, 
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. 
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL 
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY, 
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L. 
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES 
ENDRODY, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 914900027 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of 
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff 
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant 
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the 
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of 
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record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. The Court 
previously entered a Memorandum Decision, on September 21, 1993, which left open 
certain issues to be addressed at the November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, after 
hearing additional evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following Findings of Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that its Memorandum decision, filed on September 21, 
1993, should be incorporated into these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
said Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
2. The Court finds that it is clear and unambiguous that the Defendant 
transferred his one-third interest in the ranch property to the Endrody Trust on or about 
October 9,1984, upon which transfer of all of the reanch property had been conveyed 
to the Endrody Trust. The provisions of the Court's Memorandum Decision indicating 
that the Defendant had retained a one-third undivided interest in the ranch property, or 
that only two-thirds of the ranch property was conveyed to and held by the Endrody 
Trust, should be amended and modified to incorporate this finding. 
3. With respect to the Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, the Court 
finds that the Endrody Trust is a valid inter vivos trust, that the claims of the Plaintiff 
against the Trust, its beneficiary and its trustees are unsupported and should be 
dismissed, and that the property held by Endrody Trust, including the ranch property, 
the Cedar City home, the 5 acres in Enoch, the Enoch home, and the personal 
property belonging to the Endrody Trust are not marital assets and are not available 
for distribution between Plaintiff and the Defendant, but are items of property 
belonging to the Endrody Trust. 
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4. The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital 
assets and should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Court finds that these items of farm 
equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage: 
Equipment Value 
a. Cultivator $150.00 
b. Snapper Lawnmower $75.00 
c. JD Lawnmower $400.00 
d. Heston Swather $5,500.00 
e. Double rake $75.00 
f. Wire baler $5,000.00 
g. Corn planter $500.00 
h. Leveler $2,500.00 
i. JD 2750 Tractor $13,000.00 
j . JD 3 bottom plow $1,500.00 
Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff: $29,325.00 
5. The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital 
assets and should be awarded to the Defendant. The Court finds that these items of 
farm equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage: 
Equipment 
a. Hoe and Bale Wagon 
b. Hay loader 
c. JD 4230 Tractor 
Value 
$12,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$13,500.00 
$26,500.00 Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant: 
The Court also finds that the Defendant should be awarded, as his separate 
property, other items of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which were 
acquired by the Defendant prior to the parties' marriage. 
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6. The Court finds that various cattle were acquired and sold during the 
period of the parties1 marriage, but that all cattle have been sold and no division of 
cattle is necessary. 
7. The Court finds that the parties have acquired 6,000 shares of stock in 
Endrody Trucking, Inc., during the period of the marriage; that said shares should be 
treated as marital property; and that it is fair and equitable that the Plaintiff receive 
3,000 shares and the Defendant receive 3,000 shares. 
8. The debts acquired by the parties during the period of their marriage, 
including any periods of separation, should be assumed and satisfied as follows, 
except as otherwise provided herein: 
a. Plaintiff should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred by 
her during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties' 
separation; 
b. Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred 
by him during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties' 
separation; and 
c. The Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debt owed 
to Mark McKim. 
9. The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties' minor children, Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody 
and that Plaintiff should be entitled to reasonable rights of visitation with said children. 
10. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant, as and for 
child support for the parties' minor children, $177.00 per month, which amount is 
consistent with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The Court further finds that 
any modification of child support should be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's 
Child Support Guidelines. Said child support payments should continue until each 
child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue 
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child support obligations in the event that either of the parties' minor children has 
special needs which warrant a continuation of child support. 
11. The Court finds that each party should be required to keep and maintain 
medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor children, when it is available 
to them at a reasonable cost or through their respective employment. Each party 
should be required to pay one-half of all medical and dental expenses incurred by the 
parties1 minor children which are not covered by health or dental insurance. 
12. The Court finds that the Defendant should prepare and submit 
documentation of insurance records and medical and dental bills to the Plaintiff, and 
that the Plaintiff should be required to reimburse the Defendant for one-half of those 
expenses if there are medical or dental expenses which are not covered by then 
existing insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the parties' children and 
to pay those medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, should end as 
each child reaches the age of majority. 
13. The Court finds that rent was incurred by the Plaintiff, due to her 
occupation and possession of the Enoch home, belonging to the Endrody Trust, at the 
rate of $850.00 per month over a 24 month period, for a total rent due and owing to the 
Endrody Trust of $20,400.00. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible 
to pay and satisfy one-half of this rent amount, being $10,200.00, and that the 
Defendant should be responsible to pay and satisfy the remaining one-half of said rent 
amount being $10,200.00. 
14. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony from the 
Defendant in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of 
December, 1993. Alimony should terminate upon the death, remarriage or 
cohabitation of the Plaintiff or upon further Order of the Court. This alimony award is 
based upon the Court's finding that the Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that the 
Defendant has the ability to pay a reasonable sum for alimony, and the Court finds 
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that, based upon the respective circumstances of the parties, $300.00 per month is a 
reasonable sum for alimony. 
15. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's evidence at trial showed that she had 
incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $35,602.25, with costs in the total amount of 
$1,431.50. The Defendant should be required to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's 
fees, the sum of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the 
Defendant toward Plaintiff's attorney's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing the 
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees. 
16. The Court finds that the Defendant was previously found in contempt of 
Court and that the Defendant should pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff for said contempt, 
which amount will reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably 
incurred by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant's contempt. 
17. The Court finds that the 1,101 shares held by Defendant in the Endrody 
Trust are marital assets and should be equally divided between the parties; that 550 
1/2 shares should be awarded to Plaintiff and should be held in constructive trust by 
the Defendant, under which the Defendant should continue to hold title to said shares 
and Plaintiff should be awarded full use and benefit of said shares, including voting 
and distribution rights. The Court further finds that if the Trust makes any distribution, 
in any form, to its shareholders, then that portion of said distribution associated with 
Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares should be held by Defendant, in trust for 
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff should be offered her portion of any distribution to shareholders 
before any other application of the funds, including reinvestment. 
18. The Court finds that the Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in 
connection with the above-referenced constructive trust, and that Defendant should 
forward to Plaintiff any notices or information disseminated by the trust to Defendant, 
regarding trust meetings or other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial 
interest in the trust shares or her rights with respect thereto. 
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19. The Court finds that the parties have stipulated that Plaintiff is entitled to 
one-half of all retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant from the date of the 
parties marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until the Defendant retired on or 
about December 14,1991. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to one-
half of the retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant during that period of time. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, concludes that the 
foregoing findings constitute a complete and final determination of the Court relating to 
issues of the case of Endrody v. Endrody. Iron County Civil No. 914900027, and that a 
Decree and Judgment should be made and entered in accordance therewith. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY 
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the 
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, 
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC.,| 
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY, 
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A. 
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY, 
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. 
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL 
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY, 
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L. 
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES 
ENDRODY, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 914900027 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of 
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff 
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant 
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the 
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of 
record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. After trial of 
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the matter on August 25, 26 and 27, 1993, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision, 
on September 21, 1993, which left open certain issues to be addressed at the 
November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, having heard additional evidence, and being 
fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, its real and personal property 
and its trustees and beneficiaries and against Endrody Trucking, Inc., are dismissed, 
with prejudice. 
2. The marital assets of the Plaintiff and Defendant, acquired during the 
course of their marriage, are divided and awarded as follows: 
a. There is no real property owned by the Plaintiff and Defendant and 
no division of real property is necessary. 
b. Personal property: 
(1) To the Plaintiff: 
Equipment Value 
a) Cultivator $150.00 
b) Snapper Lawnmower $75.00 
c) JD Lawnmower $400.00 
d) Heston Swather $5,500.00 
e) Double rake $75.00 
f) Wire baler $5,000.00 
g) Corn planter $500.00 
h) Leveler $2,500.00 
i) JD 2750 Tractor $13,000.00 
j) JD 3 bottom plow $1,500.00 
Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff: $29,325.00 
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(2) To the Defendant: 
Equipment Value 
a) Hoe and Bale Wagon $12,000.00 
b) Hay loader $1,000.00 
c) JD 4230 Tractor $13,500.00 
Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant: $26,500.00 
c. Defendant is awarded, as his separate property, other items 
of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which are not listed above and 
which were acquired by the Defendant prior to the marriage of Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
d. All other items of personal property acquired by Plaintiff and 
Defendant during the course of the marriage shall be held by the party now in 
possession of such personal property, in accordance with the prior Orders of the 
Court, which are not inconsistent with this Judgment and Decree. 
3. There are currently no cattle which are owned by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and no award or division of cattle is necessary. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded 3,000 shares of stock in 
Endrody Trucking, Inc. 
5. The Plaintiff and Defenant are ordered to assume and satisfy the debts 
incurred during the period of their marriage, including any periods of separation, in the 
following manner: 
a. Plaintiff is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by her individually 
during the period of the marriage and during the period of her separation from 
Defendant; 
b. Defendant is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by him 
individually during the period of the marriage and during the period of his separation 
from Plaintiff; 
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c. The Defendant is also ordered to satisfy any indebtedness owed by 
either Plaintiff or Defendant to Mark McKim. 
6. Defendant is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children, 
Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody, and Plaintiff is granted reasonable rights 
of visitation with said children. 
7. Plaintiff should pay to Defendant, as and for the benefit and support of the 
minor children, $177.00 per month, as and for child support, which amount is consistent 
with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Any future modification of child support 
shall be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's Child Support Guidelines. Said child 
support payments shall continue until each child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with 
the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue the child support obligations of Defendant in 
the event that either of the minor children has special needs which warrant a 
continuation of child support. 
8. Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to keep and maintain medical 
and dental insurance for the benefit of their minor children, when such insurance 
coverage is available to either or both of them at a reasonable cost or through their 
respective employment. Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to pay one-half of all 
medical and dental expenses incurred by the minor children for any medical or dental 
expenses which are not covered by health or dental insurance. 
9. Defendant is ordered to prepare and submit documentation of medical and 
dental bills of the minor children, together with documentation on insurance payments 
for such bills, and Plaintiff is ordered to pay directly, or, where appropriate, to reimburse 
the Defendant for one-half of those expenses which are not covered by then existing 
insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the minor children and to pay for 
medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, shall end as each child reaches 
the age of majority. 
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10. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, the sum of 
$10,200.00, representing one-half of the past due rents owed to Endrody Trust for 
Plaintiff's occupation and possession of a Trust owned residence. Defendant is ordered 
to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, $10,200.00, representing one-half of the past 
due rents owed to Endrody Trust as a result of Plaintiff's occupation and possession of a 
Trust owned residence. 
11. Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony and Defendant is ordered to pay 
alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of 
December, 1993. Defendant's obligation to pay alimony to Plaintiff shall terminate upon 
the death, remarriage or cohabitation of Plaintiff, or upon further Order of the Court. 
12. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's fees, the sum 
of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the Defendant 
toward Plaintiff's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing and is ordered to pay the 
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
13. As a result of the Court's prior finding of contempt against the Defendant, 
the Defendant is ordered to pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff, which amount is meant to 
reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably associated with 
Defendant's contempt. 
14. The Court orders that the 1,101 shares in Endrody Trust, which are 
currently held by Defendant, be awarded to the parties as follows: 
a. With respect to 550 1/2 of said shares, Defendant should continue 
to hold title to said shares and continue to exercise all rights and receive all benefits 
associated with said shares, including voting rights and rights of distribution. 
b. With respect to the remaining 550 1/2 shares, said shares should 
be held in constructive trust by Defendant, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff. Defendant 
shall continue to hold title to said shares, while Plaintiff is awarded full use and benefit of 
said shares, including voting and distribution rights. 
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c. In accordance with the above-referenced constructive trust, upon 
any distribution to shareholders by the trust, Defendant is ordered to hold that portion of 
said distribution associated with Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares, and 
Defendant is ordered to notify Plaintiff of said distribution and to offer Plaintiff her portion 
of any such distribution before any other application of the funds, including 
reinvestment. 
d. Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in connection with the 
above-referenced constructive trust, and Defendant is ordered to forward to Plaintiff any 
notices or information provided to Defendant by the Trust, regarding Trust meetings or 
other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial interest in the trust shares or her 
rights with respect thereto. 
15. Plaintiff is awarded one-half of the retirement benefits accumulated by 
Defendant, from the date of the parties' marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until 
the Defendant retired on or about December 14,1991. 
16. The parties shall cooperate in executing such documents as may be 
necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Judgment and Decree. 
17. Should any party fail to comply with the provisions of this Judgment and 
Decree, the nondefaulting party shall be entitled to any costs or expenses, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in enforcing the provisions hereof. 
18. This Judgment and Order shall become final immediately upon entry by 
the Court. a _ 
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Approved as to Form and Content 
J^MES-R^PfkTE^Q. 
The Park-F i rm— -^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
LASZLO ENDRODY, JR. 
Defendant, Pro Se 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of _, 1994,1 served a copy 
of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND DECREE on each of the following by depositing a 
copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
James M. Park, Esq. 
THE PARK FIRM 
965 South Main, #3 
PO Box 765 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Laszlo Endrody, Jr. 
PO Box 1083 
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083 
MfaOitfifljtotiA* 
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Approved as to Form and Content 
JAMES M. PARK, ESQ 
The Park-Fin 
Attorneys for/Plaintiff 
LASZLO ENDRODY, 4 
Defendant, Pro Se 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of ()£&£• . 1994,1 served a copy 
of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND DECREE on each of the following by depositing a 
copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
James M. Park, Esq. 
THE PARK FIRM 
965 South Main, #3 
PO Box 765 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Laszlo Endrody, Jr. 
PO Box 1083 
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083 
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